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Abstract 
The vast majority of meaningful discussions about the processes of economic 
integration and liberalization of trade have so far revolved around the neoclassical 
theory. This paper is based on the neo-Ricardian theory, briefly investigates the issues 
of free trade, customs unions and common markets, and shows that the relevant 
neoclassical propositions do not hold and/or make no sense in a world ‘of production 
of commodities by means of commodities’. Thus, the fundamental theoretical 
presuppositions of the aforesaid debate are called in question.  
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Introduction 
Processes of economic integration are in progress all over the world, whilst at the 
same time the World Trade Organization is promoting, through negotiations, the 
gradual liberalization of the international trade in goods and services. As is expected, 
all these processes generate heated discussions and polemics, which do not always 
bear the characteristics of a scientific dialogue. 
 Setting aside all the scientifically unfounded perceptions (aptly criticized by 
Krugman, 1994), the vast majority of the remaining positions are based, implicitly or 
otherwise, on the principles of the traditional, neoclassical theory of international 
trade and, more generally, of international economics.
1
 Hence, the central message of 
the prevailing scientific debate may be summed up as follows: the liberalization of 
trade yields gains in all the participating nations iff it takes place in the direction 
determined by the ‘law of comparative advantage’. If the conceptual and analytical 
framework of the traditional theory is accepted, then, undoubtedly, this message must 
also be accepted. But does the traditional theory constitute a coherent and reliable 
depiction of the real economic world? 
 This paper is not a critique of the prevailing discussion but of its fundamental 
theoretical presuppositions. Specifically, it is based on the principles of the neo-
Ricardian (or Sraffian) theory of closed and open systems,
2
 and shows that the 
traditional, neoclassical propositions concerning the issues of free trade, customs 
unions and common markets do not hold and/or make no sense in a world ‘of 
production of commodities by means of commodities’ (Sraffa, 1960). For simplicity’s 
sake, but also in order to enable a direct comparison of our findings with those of the 
traditional theory, the analysis focuses on two-sector systems of single production.
3
 
However, when it is deemed necessary, we allow for more than two sectors or joint 
production. 
                                                        
1 See Krugman (1996), El-Agraa (1997), Jovanović (1998), Krugman and Obstfeld (2000, chs 7 and 9), 
Samuelson (2004), inter alia. 
2 See Pasinetti (1977), Kurz and Salvadori (1995, 1998), and Parrinello (1970), Steedman (1979A, 
1979B, 1987, 1999), respectively. 
3 For systematic (and updated) reviews of the traditional (textbook ‘Ricardian’ and Heckscher-Ohlin) 
theory, see Matsuyama (2008) and Jones (2003), respectively. 
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 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a 
basic model for a two-sector closed economy. The following three sections deal with 
trade, customs union, and common market issues, respectively. The final section 
concludes.  
 
The Closed Economy 
Consider a closed economy, which produces two commodities, 1 and 2, each of which 
serves a dual role as a capital good and as a consumption commodity. The economy 
has a linear, productive and irreducible single production technique à la Sraffa (1960, 
Part I). Labour is fully employed. The uniform rate of growth, g , equals zero, the 
uniform rate of interest (or profit), r , is (semi-) positive and it is given from outside 
the system.
4
 The uniform money wage rate, w , is paid at the end of the common 
production period. Finally, all consumers have identical, homothetic preferences. 
Thus, the aggregate consumption pattern depends only upon relative commodity 
prices. 
 On the basis of these assumptions we can write: 
 
T T T(1 )r w  p p A l                                                      (1) 
 
* 1(1 )r r R                                                         (2) 
 1 2 1 2( / ) /( / ) /U c U c p p                                              (3) 
  x Ax c                                                                        (4) 
 
T 1l x                                                                              (5) 
  12211  cpcp                                                                (6) 
where p  denotes the vector of commodity prices, [ ]ijaA , ,  1,  2i j  , the matrix of 
input-output coefficients, [ ]jll  ( 0 ) the  vector of direct labour coefficients, 
*r  the 
exogenously given value of the interest rate,  ( 1)   the Perron-Frobenius (P-F 
hereafter) eigenvalue of matrix A , R  the maximum rate of profit, 1 2( , )U c c  a 
homothetic preference function for commodities, 
T
1 2[ , ]c cc  the vector of 
consumption per unit of labour (‘ T ’ is the sign for transpose) , and x  the vector of 
                                                        
4 Essentially, nothing would change if we assumed that g  was positive, but smaller than r . Regarding 
this, i.e., the role of the so-called ‘golden rule hypothesis’, rg  , see, e.g., Pasinetti (1977, ch. 7). 
 4 
gross output per unit of labour.
5
 Relation (3) derives from the first-order conditions for 
utility-maximisation, (5) is an identity, and (6) is the normalization condition, i.e., we 
adopt the endogenously determined vector of consumption as the standard of value or 
numéraire and, therefore, w  also symbolizes the level of the real wage rate (for a 
thorough analysis of this system, see Johansen, 1963; Mainwaring, 1974 and 1982). 
 From (4) and (5) we get the ‘production-possibilities frontier’ (PPF):  
 
T T 1[ ]  =1 l x l I A c  
or 
 
 
T
1 1 2 2 1c c   ω c                                                         (7) 
where I  denotes the identity matrix, 
T T 1
1 2[ , ] [ ] 
  ω l I A  the vector of the 
quantities of labour ‘embodied’ in the different commodities (or ‘Ricardian-Marxian 
labour values’), and 2 1/   the ‘marginal rate of transformation in production’. 
Relation (1) determines the relative prices as a function of r : 
 T T 1 T[ (1 ) ] ( )w r w r   p l I A ω  
or 
 
 1 2 1 2( ) / ( ) / ( )P r p p r r                                                              (8) 
with 
 
 1 2(0) /P                                                                                   (8a) 
 
 1 11 2 21 2 22 1 12 1 2( ) 0 ( ) /( ) /P r l a l a l a l a l l    
                                (8b) 
 
 1 2 1 2(0) 0 ( ) (0) / /P P r P l l     
                                        (8c) 
                                                        
5
 One may assume the following intertemporal utility function 
 
 1 2
0
(1 ) ( , )t t t
t
U c c



                                                            (3a) 
 
where  ( 0)   denotes the given rate of time preference and ( )U   the period utility function. As is 
well known, maximisation of the intertemporal utility function implies that: 
 
 1 (1 )(1 )r g                                                              (3b) 
or 
 r g          
 
Thus, given a zero or positive g  (in the latter case g  is set equal to the growth rate of the labour 
force), r  is determined by (3b).  
 5 
where  
       
T T 1
1 2[ ( )] [ ( ), ( )] [ (1 ) ]r r r r 
   ω l I A   
denotes the vector of labour values associated with the imaginary production 
technique [(1 ) , ]r A l  (or ‘ r  labour values’), and ( )P r  the first derivative of the 
relative prices with respect to r . Consequently, the marginal rate of transformation 
shows relative commodity prices (i.e., the ‘labour theory of value’ and the traditional 
neoclassical theory of prices hold) iff 0r  or 
T
l  is the left-hand side P-F eigenvector 
of A  (the latter case corresponds to Marx’s ‘equal organic compositions of capital’ 
case).
6
 
 From (2) and (8) we obtain the value of the relative prices 
 
* * * *
1 2( ) ( ) / ( )P P r r r                                            (9) 
and thus, the horizontal relative supply curve in the economy. The relative demand 
curve (derived from (6)), the relative supply curve and equation (7) determine the 
equilibrium value of c  (see Figure 1a-b, drawn from the case ( ) 0P r  ). 
 
   Figure 1a                                              Figure 1b 
 
Finally, we obtain the so-called ‘factor price frontier’ (or ‘w r  trade off’), i.e., 
                                                        
6 Within the context of the neoclassical theory, the following holds: when perfect competition in the 
product markets breaks down or when a factor market distortion is present, the absolute slope of the 
production-possibilities frontier will, in general, fail to show relative prices (see, e.g., Chacholiades, 
1978, p. 111 and ch. 20). For an immanent critique of the neoclassical theory, which is based on the 
general proof of the proposition that ‘a positive rate of interest is equivalent in its effects to a factor 
market distortion’, see Steedman (1979B, Essay 4). 
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* T * T * T * T 1 *( , ) [ ]w r r r     c p c p Ax p c p A I A c  
or 
 
 
* * T * 1( , ) 1 ( , ) {[ ( )] }w r rK r r   c c ω c                  (10) 
 
 
whith
7
 
 
* * *( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0w r K r rK r   c c c                                   (10a) 
 
 
* *( , ) 0 ( , ) 0w r K r  c c                                               (10b) 
 
where *c  denotes the equilibrium value of c  and 
*( , )K r c  the capital-labour ratio 
associated with *c  (see, e.g., Figure 2, where *1 w  equals the profits per unit of 
labour, tan  gives the equilibrium value of the capital-labour ratio, and OA gives the 
equilibrium value of the net output (consumption) – capital ratio).8 
                                                        
7 It should be noted that in joint production systems it is possible for there to be a positive correlation 
between w  and r  (‘no rw   trade-off’; Steedman, 1982, pp. 383-384; d’Autume, 1988, pp. 343-345; 
Bidard, 1997, p. 689). Since in the real world joint production constitutes the rule (see Steedman, 
1984), this finding would seem to be of some importance. 
8 It goes without saying that 
*c  varies with r  (in a definite way). Hence, a change in r  changes the 
‘ rw   trade-off’. Assume, for example, a Cobb-Douglas utility function, i.e., 
1
1 2 1 2( , )
a aU c c c c  . It 
then follows that the equilibrium values of the wage rate are given by 
 
 
* 1
1 1 2 2( ) [( / ( )) ( / ( ))](1 )w r r b r b   
                                     (11) 
 
where 
1(1 )b a a  .  
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Figure 2 
 
Free Trade 
Now consider three closed economies ,  ,  A B C , which have different techniques of 
production, and investigate the trading possibilities between these economies.
9
 Also, 
assume that (i) there are no impediments to trade; (ii) trade is balanced; (iii) both 
labour and money (financial) capital are internationally immobile; (iv) for each 
economy, the interest rate is the same in no- and with-trade equilibria; and (v) the 
‘motive’ for trade is the attainment of a superior rw   combination, i.e., we deal with 
the issue of international specialization as a particular issue of the ‘choice of 
technique’ (see Mainwaring, 1974, pp. 537 and 541-542; Steedman, 1979A, chs 4-5 
and 9-10; Kurz and Salvadori, 1995, pp. 149-150).  
 Let 1 2/
k k kP p p  be the without trade relative prices in economy , , , CBAk   and 
let 1 2/
t t tP p p  be the international price ratio. From (1) and (6) we obtain 
 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) 
k k k k tw w w P P                                     (12) 
                                                        
9 It should be stressed that our analysis takes the form of comparative statics (or comparative dynamics, 
if 0g  ). The issue of transition from autarky to trade, or vice versa, is beyond the scope of this paper 
(regarding this issue, see Steedman, 1979B, Essays 4 and 12; Evans, 1989, pp. 196-203; Mainwaring, 
1991, ch. 2).   
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where kw  is the without trade real wage rate in k , and 
k
jw  is the real wage rate in k , 
when it specializes in process 2 ,1j .10 Hence, the international relative supply 
curve, S , has the form depicted in Figure 3 (we assume that 
CBA PPP  , D is the 
international relative demand curve, and, therefore, 1 1 1 11 2 2( ) [( ) ( ) ]
A B COE        , 
1 1
1 1 2[( ) ( ) ]
A B COF      , and economies A and B export commodity 1, whilst C 
exports commodity 2).
11
 When economy k  specializes in commodity 1, it has the 
following ‘consumption-possibilities frontier’ (CPF):  
 1 1 1 11 21 1 1 2( / )[( ) ( ) ] ( ) ( )
k k k k t k t kc a l P P c                                  (13) 
whilst when it specializes in commodity 2 it has the following CPF: 
 12 12 2 2 1( / )( ) ( )
k k k k T k t kc a l P P c                                  (14) 
where 1 2/
k k k   . From (7) and (13) or, respectively, from (7) and (14), it follows 
that nothing prevents the appearance of negative gain from trade, precisely because 
nothing prevents the validity of the following relations: 
 k t kP P                                                (13a) 
or, respectively,
12
 
 
k t kP P                                                    (14a) 
(see also Figure 4, drawn for the former case, where 1tan ( )ty P  ). 
                                                        
10 In joint production systems, when there is no ‘ rw   trade-off’, (12) has no general validity. 
Specifically, it is entirely possible for the following to hold: 
 
 1 2{( , ) }
k k k t kw w w P P    and 2 1{( ( ) } ( ) }
k k k tw w P P                 (12a)                  
Thus, there is not always a pattern of international specialization, which would entail the increase of the 
real wage rate in both economies (Mariolis, 2004). 
11 In joint production systems (irrespective of whether (12a) holds or does not hold) it is possible for 
there to be (at certain values of the interest rate, and iff A 0  and gr  ) a negative correlation 
between the relative supply of the commodities and their relative price, i.e., a ‘perverse’ relative supply 
curve. Consequently, the ‘law of comparative advantage’ has no general validity (Mariolis, 2004). 
Nevertheless, it should also be noted that ‘perverse’ relative supply curves appear in the framework of 
certain single-product systems (i.e., two commodities, which are used both as means of production and 
as means of consumption - zero net accumulation with fixed supplies of two homogeneous primary 
inputs - many techniques; see Steedman, 1979B, Essays 2-3).   
12 Evidently, these relations cannot hold iff A 0  or rg 0 , since A 0  (or 0 rg ) 
implies that 
k kP  , whilst rg 0  implies that 1 2( ) ( ) / ( )
k k k kP g g g    , where 
T T 1( ) [ (1 ) ]g g   ω l I A  denotes the vector of the ‘synchronized labour costs or Austrian 
socially necessary labour’ (see Samuelson and v. Weizsäcker, 1971), and 
1( ( ))k g    gives the slope 
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Figure 3                                                     Figure 4 
 
 We conclude, therefore, that neither the pattern of international specialization nor 
the sign of gains from trade can be determined a priori. Evidently, the aforesaid 
indeterminacy is due to the fact that the ‘comparative advantage’ depends on the 
distribution of income, i.e., on the exogenously given value of the interest rate, whilst 
the sign of gains from trade is determined by (13a) and (14a), i.e., a posteriori. Thus, a 
change in r  may change the order of , , A B CP P P , the position of the international 
relative supply curve, and, ultimately, also the signs of gains from trade: Let us 
assume, for example, that the functions of relative prices in economies CBA  , ,  have 
the forms depicted in Figure 5. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
of the CPF in a closed, growing economy (see also footnote 6 of this paper, as well as Steedman, 
1979B, Essays 8, 11 and 14). So, the gains are necessarily positive only in these trivial cases.  
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Figure 5 
 
At 
*
1rr
k   the following holds 
 AABBCC PPP                                        
(15) 
If 
B t AP P   , then C  and B  export commodity 1, A  exports commodity 2, and 
all the economies gain from trade. If 
B t BP P  , the pattern of specialization does 
not change, but B  loses. At 
*
4rr
k   the following holds 
 
ACBBCA PPP                                                 (16) 
If 
C t BP P   , A  exports commodity 1, , B C  export commodity 2, whilst , A C  
lose and B  gains. If 
B t BP P  , A  and B  export commodity 1, C  exports 
commodity 2, and all the economies lose.
13
 Finally, at 
*
3
*
2  , rrrr
CB  , and for 
Arr *2  it is possible for the following to hold 
 
ABCBAC PPP                                                
(17) 
If 
t CP P , A  takes the place of the so-called ‘small economy’, exports commodity 1 
and loses. Also, it is possible for B and C  to specialize completely in commodity 2 
                                                        
13 When one (or more) economy loses, the reverse of the pattern of specialization through tariff and 
non-tariff policies may lead to positive gain from trade (Mainwaring, 1976; Steedman, 1979A, chs 6, 7 
and 10).  
 11 
(what exactly happens will depend on the conditions of demand). In that case the 
‘large economy’ B  gains, whilst the ‘large economy’ C  loses.
14
  
 
 
4. Customs Unions 
In accordance with the traditional 3 2  theory of customs unions (Gehrels, 1956; 
Lipsey, 1957, 1960), consider three economies: A  (home economy), B  (partner) and 
C  (rest of the world). Economies B  and C  are ‘large’, produce the two commodities, 
and levy prohibitive tariffs on each other’s products. Economy C  has a comparative 
advantage in the production of commodity 2 (i.e., CB PP  ). Finally, economy A  is 
‘small’, and specializes completely in the production of commodity 1 (i.e., 
CBA PPP  ; see Figure 6, where 1tan ( )Cy P   and 1tan ( )Bz P  ). 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
 Before a customs union is formed between A  and B , A  levies a non-
discriminatory tariff on all imports of commodity 2. Assuming that all tariff revenue is 
returned to the consumers as a lump sum, it follows that A  trades with C  only, and 
                                                        
14 It may be noted that the appearance of negative gains is entirely possible also in the framework of 
endogenous growth models à la King and Rebelo (1990) (Mariolis, 2005).  
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reaches equilibrium at tE  (where the marginal rate of substitution in consumption 
equals A ’s domestic price ratio given by the reciprocal absolute slope of the line tt ).  
 After the customs union is formed between A  and B , A ’s tariff on imports from 
B  is eliminated, and A ’s imports shift to B  at B ’s price ratio BP . Iff the line AB  
lies above tU , then A  becomes better off, because A  reaches equilibrium at a point, 
such as cE , which lies on a higher indifference curve, cU , than 
tE . 
 In contrast to the traditional theory, the following points should be noted:  
(i). It is possible for A to lose from free trade. When this is indeed the case (i.e., 
ACP  ), A  is in a position to gain from trade if it specializes in commodity 2, i.e., 
in the commodity in which it has a comparative disadvantage, and levies a tariff on all 
imports of commodity 1.  
(ii). Even if A  gains from free trade, it is possible for the situation of autarky to be 
preferable (in terms of consumption possibilities) to the formation of a customs union 
(this is indeed the case when, and only when, 
CAB PP  ).  
(iii). Ceteris paribus, whether the line AB  lies above tU  depends on the value of 
Br .15 Thus, the following traditional proposition: ‘At the customs union and free trade 
area levels, the possible sources of economic gain from economic integration can be 
attributed to […] enhanced efficiency in production made possible by increased 
specialization in accordance with the law of comparative advantage, due to the 
liberalised market of the participating nations’ (El-Agraa, 1997, p. 5; see also, ibid., 
pp. 34-35), cannot generally be sustained. On the one hand, the ‘comparative 
advantage’ is determined (also) by the distribution of income and, on the other, an 
‘increased specialization in accordance with the law of comparative advantage’ indeed 
guarantees the attainment of a superior wage rate – interest rate combination16 but not 
necessarily the improvement of consumption possibilities. 
(iv). Given the conditions of production and demand, even the identification of 
economies as ‘small/large’ (as well as the determination of the static effects of 
                                                        
15 If each consumption commodity is produced in its own integrated sector, the commodity price ratio 
is a non-monotonic function of the interest rate (see, e.g., Steedman, 1979B, Essay 5). Consequently, a 
change in the distribution of income has unpredictable effects on the relative position of the said line. 
16
 However, this is not always true (see footnotes 10 and 11 of this paper).  
 13 
customs unions as a whole; for the traditional analysis, see, e.g., Chacholiades, 1978, 
ch. 23) critically depends on the distribution of income.
17
 
 
5. Common Markets 
Consider two closed economies, A  and B , with 
BA rr  , and assume that (i) 
commodities are consumed in fixed proportions irrespective of relative prices (i.e., 
1 2/c c  is given from outside the system); and (ii) the economies allow either the free 
movement of money (or financial) capital (case 1) or the free movement of money 
capital and labour (case 2). In the former case an internationally uniform interest rate 
is established, whilst in the latter case an internationally uniform wage rate is also 
established.
18
 
 We shall deal with these cases in turn:
19
 
Case 1. If the economies share an identical technology, then they choose either the 
same technique or different techniques, which constitute a convex, linear combination 
of the same techniques (‘switch point case’). Thus, as a result of the free movement of 
money capital, an internationally uniform wage rate is also established. However, it is 
                                                        
17 It has been shown that when an economy has a set of alternative techniques of production, and the 
number of these techniques is greater than or equal to the number of commodities, the price vector may 
be repeated over a range of the interest rate (it then follows immediately that the well-known ‘factor 
price equalisation theorem’ is not of general logical validity; Steedman, 1979B, Essays 6, 7 and 10). 
Consequently, if economies CBA ,,  have different sets of alternative techniques (i.e., different 
technologies; for the traditional analysis, see Michaely, 1965; Melvin, 1969), more than one 
combination of 
CBA rrr ,,  can be associated with the same relative prices 
CBA PPP ,, . In such a 
case, different distributions of income lead to the same situation in terms of Figure 6, but possibly in 
different situations in terms of consumption possibilities (as a result of the choice of different 
production techniques).  
18
 For the traditional analysis of these cases, see Mundell (1957); MacDougal (1960); Kemp (1966); 
Jones (1979, Part 4), Journal of International Economics (1983); Ruffin (1984); Caves et al. (1990, chs 
9-10); and Razin and Sadka (2001, chs 1-2). It is important to note the following: ‘[S]ome analyses of 
the ‘international mobility of capital’ proceed as if a country’s endowment of ‘capital’ were a quantity 
of a homogeneous, physical input, part of which may be used in domestic production, whilst the 
remainder is ‘hired’ for use in another country! It is, perhaps, not entirely clear to what real world 
process such an analysis is supposed to correspond, unless it be the leasing of ships and aircraft. In the 
real world, international investment flows are, in themselves, financial flows. The latter will, of course, 
often lead directly to trade flows of the specific capital goods to be used in, say, equipping a factory but 
it is nevertheless crucial to keep the two types of flow conceptually distinct. That distinction is, 
however, always in danger of being lost in an analysis based on the conception of an aggregate ‘factor’ 
called ‘capital’, since, as is now widely recognised, that conception has fused – and confused – the 
concepts of ‘capital as finance’ and ‘capital as specific means of production’.’ (Steedman, 1979B, pp. 
9-10). 
19 For alternative analyses, which emphasise different aspects, see Brewer (1985), Abraham-Frois 
(2006) and Parrinello (2006). 
 14 
impossible to say a priori that the ‘gains from free trade in capital services’ are 
positive (Consider Figure 3 and, for example, Figure 7, where r  is the uniform 
interest rate, kc , c  represent the level of consumption per head in the autarchic 
economy k  and in the open system, respectively, and a , b  represent ‘switch points’. 
In both economies, consumption per head, consumption per capital and profits per 
head are reduced). 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
 
 If the economies have different technologies, then, in general, the relative 
commodity prices will differ as between the economies. Hence there is a basis for 
commodity trade. However, the pattern of specialization, the sign of the gains, the 
changes in the consumption – capital ratios, and so on, are not unambiguously 
determined. Not only because what was said on the basis of Figures 5 and 7 
essentially continues to hold, but also because, now, the relative commodity prices are 
not, in general, monotonic functions of the interest rate (see, for example, Figure 8, 
where the points a  and , b c  correspond to ‘switch points’ on the wage-profit frontier 
for A ’s and B ’s technology, respectively). 
 
 15 
 
Figure 8 
 
 
  
Case 2. In this case, i.e., in the framework of a common market, the law that governs 
the international division/combination of labour is the ‘law of absolute advantage’. If 
economies A  and B  have different technologies, then, precisely because of the 
possible existence of so-called ‘negative price Wicksell effects’ and phenomena of 
‘switching-reswitching’ of techniques (see, e.g., Kurz and Salvadori, 1995, ch. 14), 
any a priori determination of the pattern of specialization is, in the general case, 
impossible. Thus, it is not possible to know the sign of the gains that arise from this 
form of economic integration. Ceteris paribus, everything depends on the value of the 
interest rate. Assuming, for example, that each economy has only one process ( )k j  
for the production of commodity j , where BAk  ,  and 2 ,1j , it follows that the 
international system has the following four alternative techniques of production: 
{ (1), (2)}I A A , { (1), (2)}II B B , { (1), (2)}III B A  and { (1), (2)}IV A B . So, let us 
accept that the ‘ rw   relationships’ are depicted in Figure 9.20 
 
                                                        
20 It is well known that (i) two ‘adjacent’ techniques on two sides of a ‘switch point’ will differ in only 
one process, except for fluke cases (Bruno et al., 1966, p. 542; Pasinetti, 1977, ch. 6, § 5.3); and (ii) in 
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Figure 9 
 
 
Consequently, if 10 rr   or 32 rrr  , then B  does not produce any commodity, 
whilst if 21 rrr   3( )r r R  , then B  produces commodity 2 (1). As is well 
known, at 3rr   it holds (analogously for the other ‘switch points’; see, e.g., Kurz and 
Salvadori, 1995, ch. 3):  
 
T T T
3 3(1 ) [ ]
A Ar w  p p A l                      
or 
                            
T
3 1 3 2 3/ [ ( ), ( )]
A Aw r r p                          (18) 
and 
 1 3 1 11 2 21 3 1(1 )( )
B B Bp r p a p a w l                                                               (18a) 
which imply that 
 
 1 3 11 2 3 21 1( ) ( ) 0
A Ar a r a l                                                        (19) 
 
where ,   B A B Aij ij ija a a l l l      . For 2 3r r r   it holds: 
                            1 11 2 21 1( ) ( ) 0
A Ar a r a l                                                                        (19a) 
whilst for Rrr 3  it holds: 
                            1 11 2 21 1( ) ( ) 0
A Ar a r a l                                             (19b) 
                                                                                                                                                               
two-sector models the maximum number of switches between two ‘adjacent’ techniques equals 2 iff the 
relevant ‘ rw   relationships’ are both concave or both convex  (Woods, 1988, pp. 89-90).  
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Also, when at a value of r  the techniques I  and II  are equally profitable (in that 
case all the techniques are equally profitable; this fluke case does not appear in Figure 
9), it holds: 
 ( ) ( ),   1,  2A Bj jr r j                                                    (20) 
i.e., each economy is in a position to produce both commodities. 
 Thus, we may conclude that there is not an unambiguous relation between the 
productivities of labour and technique choice (i.e., between 1 11 2( ) , ( )
k k    and the 
pattern of specialization).
21
 Finally, it should be noted that this conclusion holds also 
when the economies produce nontraded goods. In that case (which may be analysed 
by following Sraffa, 1960, §§ 93-4, and Bharadwaj, 1970) the determination of the 
‘switch points’ is carried out on the basis of relations, which have the same structure 
(and meaning) with (19), (19a-b) and (20), but represent the processes producing 
traded goods. Consequently, at a ‘switch point’ only the prices of traded goods are 
identical, whilst nothing can be said a priori about the relationships between the prices 
of nontraded goods. Evidently, this means that, in the general case, the relative 
international price levels cannot be unambiguously correlated with international 
productivity differences (in traded and nontraded goods). Therefore, all those 
propositions, which are related, directly or indirectly, to the so-called ‘Harrod – 
Balassa – Samuelson effect’ (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1998, ch. 4) and which 
are systematically used for the theoretical and empirical analysis not only of actual 
economic integrations but also of the international system as a whole (see, e.g., De 
Grauwe, 2000, chs 1-2; Krugman and Obstfeld, 2000, ch. 15), should be regarded with 
scepticism. The aforesaid propositions are based on the traditional conceptual and 
analytical framework.
22
 
 
6. Concluding Remark 
The placement of the produced means of production and income distribution at the 
centre of the analysis leads the elementary, static theory of trade, customs unions and 
                                                        
21 It goes without saying that, in joint production systems, the pattern of specialization can change in a 
complicated way as the conditions of demand change (see, e.g., Kurz and Salvadori, 1995, ch.8; Bidard, 
1997). 
22
 For a detailed investigation, see Mariolis (2008). 
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common markets to results that deviate to a significant degree from established results 
and do not allow the drawing of unambiguous conclusions. This ‘indeterminacy’ does 
not indicate a weakness in the theory but rather expresses a feature of economic reality 
itself. Thus, it should constitute an incentive for theoretical and empirical research. At 
all events, a critical examination of the prevailing discussions about the processes of 
economic integration and liberalization of trade becomes absolutely necessary.  
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